A Bad Case of Indigestion: Internalizing Changes in the Right to Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington Both Nationally and in Wisconsin by Kinnally, Rorry
Marquette Law Review
Volume 89
Issue 3 Spring 2006 Article 7
A Bad Case of Indigestion: Internalizing Changes in
the Right to Confrontation After Crawford v.
Washington Both Nationally and in Wisconsin
Rorry Kinnally
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Rorry Kinnally, A Bad Case of Indigestion: Internalizing Changes in the Right to Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington Both
Nationally and in Wisconsin, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 625 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol89/iss3/7
A BAD CASE OF INDIGESTION:
INTERNALIZING CHANGES IN THE RIGHT
TO CONFRONTATION AFTER CRA WFORD V.
WASHINGTON BOTH NATIONALLY AND IN
WISCONSIN
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, brothers David and Robert Bintz, along with a friend, went to a
local bar to pick up some packaged beer.1 After learning he had been
overcharged for the beer, David called the female bartender and threatened to
blow up the bar.2 The bartender was found murdered a few days later.3 No
one was charged with the crime, and the case remained open.4
Twelve years later, in 1998, David was serving time in prison for an
unrelated crime.5 His cellmate, Gary Swendby, noticed that David was
having frequent nightmares and was yelling out in his sleep about killing a
woman. 6 When Swendby questioned David about the nightmares, David
confessed that he and his brother, Robert, had killed the bartender and
disposed of the body.7 Swendby told authorities, and both brothers were tried
separately for party to the crime of first-degree murder.8
At David's trial, Swendby testified against him. 9 David was convicted of
first-degree murder. 10 At Robert's trial, both Robert and David refused to
testify and plead the Fifth Amendment.11 Swendby was unavailable for
testimony because he had since died in an automobile accident.12 The court
admitted Swendby's statements under the hearsay exception; the court held
1. State v. Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, 2, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 2, 650 N.W.2d 913, 2.
2. Id., 2,257 Wis. 2d 177, 2,650 N.W.2d 913, 2.
3. Id., 257 Wis. 2d 177, 2, 650 N.W.2d 913, 2.
4. Id., 257 Wis. 2d 177, 2, 650 N.W.2d 913, 2.
5. Id., 13, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 3,650 N.W.2d 913, 3.
6. Id., 257 Wis. 2d 177,13, 650 N.W.2d 913, 3.
7. Id., 257 Wis. 2d 177,13, 650 N.W.2d 913, 3.
8. Id., 4, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 4, 650 N.W.2d 913, 4.
9. Id., 257 Wis. 2d 177, 4, 650 N.W.2d 913, 4.
10. Id., 257 Wis. 2d 177, 4,650 N.W.2d 913, 4.
11. Id., 5, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 5, 650 N.W.2d 913, 5.
12. Id., 5, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 5, 650 N.W.2d 913, 15.
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that, under White v. Illinois, 3 Swendby was (1) unavailable and (2)
Swendby's statements were reliable because David had the opportunity to
cross-examine him at the preliminary hearing and at trial. 
1 4
Because both brothers were charged as parties to a crime, the court held
that their interests in cross-examining the cellmate were very similar. 15 Thus,
the transcripts were admissible as prior testimony. 16  Robert was also
convicted of first-degree murder, party to a crime. 7
Bintz was a leading case in the area of hearsay and the Confrontation
Clause in Wisconsin jurisprudence before March 8, 2004, when the Crawford
v. Washington 18 decision was released; however, the Bintz rationale has now
been swallowed by a hungry and expanding Confrontation Clause. But does
the Confrontation Clause really save the day for defendants like the Bintz
brothers? And how has Wisconsin reacted to Crawford, hearsay, and
confrontation?
Part II of this Note will discuss the history of the Confrontation Clause
and hearsay in the American courts. Part III discusses the manner in which
the Crawford v. Washington decision altered the Confrontation right. Parts
IV, V, and VI explain the issues that are still being considered by lower courts
in the aftermath of Crawford. Part VII discusses Wisconsin's current
jurisprudence and the probability of future issues with regard to the
Confrontation Clause. And finally, Part VIII discusses this author's
conclusions about Wisconsin, hearsay, and the Confrontation Clause. This
Note was intended to guide the bench and practitioners in identifying issues,
dividing lines, and remedies to Confrontation Clause and hearsay problems in
the context of criminal courts.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND HEARSAY
EXCEPTIONS
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution's Confrontation Clause
provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him." 19 This means that a
criminal defendant has the constitutionally protected right to confront at trial
or in a judicial hearing any witnesses that have made statements against him.
13. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
14. Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, 5, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 5, 650 N.W.2d 913, T 5.
15. Id., 17, 257 Wis. 2d 177, T 17, 650N.W.2d 913, 17.
16. Id., 15, 257 Wis. 2d 177, T 15, 650 N.W.2d 913, 15.
17. Id., 5,257 Wis. 2d 177, 5, 650 N.W.2d 913, 5.
18. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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This Confrontation Clause guarantee applies at both the state and the federal
level.2°
The Confrontation right is particularly relevant in the context of hearsay.
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."'', Testimony may be admitted under a hearsay exception at trial as
long as it does not abridge the defendant's confrontation right.22
What it means to violate a defendant's confrontation right, however, has
been argued for more than a century.23
One of the earliest U.S. Supreme Court decisions under the Confrontation
Clause, Mattox v. United States,24 began the controversy over which hearsay
evidence could be admitted in criminal trials. In Mattox, the defendant raised
a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause challenge to the admissibility at his
retrial of stenographic notes of testimony from two witnesses at the
defendant's first trial.25 The witnesses had died before the retrial.26
The Court held that admitting the testimony was necessary because the
witnesses had died; the Court also held that the defendant had a prior
opportunity to exercise his Sixth Amendment rights when he cross-examined
the witnesses in the first trial.27
28Seventy years later, in Pointer v. Texas, the Court held that admitting
testimony that had been taken at a preliminary hearing violated the
Confrontation Clause because neither of the defendants had been represented
by a lawyer at that hearing and thus lacked the ability to cross-examine the
witnesses against them.29  Then, in Barber v. Page,30 a witness's prior
testimony at the preliminary hearing, although it was cross-examined, was
20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.
21. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 801.
23. Although hearsay objections are closely tied to the Confrontation right, a hearsay objection
technically rests on a different basis than a Confrontation Clause objection does. Warren Moise,
Beyond the Bar: The Confrontations Clause and Justice Scalia: Everything Old is New Again, 16
S.C. LAWYER 11, 11 (2004). In Bunton v. State, 136 S.W.3d 355, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), an
appellate review of the Confrontation Clause violation was not required when only a hearsay
objection was raised at trial. Id. Thus, an objection to either a Confrontation Clause violation or
inadmissible hearsay may be inadequate to preserve an appeal on the other one. Id.
24. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
25. Id. at 260-61.
26. Id. at 261.
27. Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 HOuS. L. REV. 1003,
1038-39 (2003).
28. 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Chase, supra note 27, at 1039.
29. Chase, supra note 27, at 1040.
30. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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inadmissible because the State failed to show that the witness was actually
unavailable to testify.31
Finally, the Court again considered admissibility of preliminary hearing
testimony under the Confrontation Clause in California v. Green.32  The
Court established several rules concerning prior testimony hearsay evidence:
(1) preliminary hearing testimony is admissible in a trial if the defendant had
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the prosecutor shows that the
witness is unavailable, and (2) the witness's preliminary hearing testimony
may be admitted at trial "if the witness is testifying at trial, concedes making
the statements, and is subject to cross-examination both as to the trial
testimony and the prior preliminary hearing testimony. 33
Despite these new rules, the Court had yet to determine the underlying
principles that make such rules correct. In the following years, the Court
developed the theory that the Confrontation Clause and the rule against
hearsay effectively protected the same interests: the right of a defendant to
have face-to-face confrontation with an accuser.34 In the following cases, the
Court explores this principle.
A. The Confrontation Clause Under Ohio v. Roberts
In Ohio v. Roberts,35 the Court established guidelines to decide when
hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant violates his Confrontation
Clause right.36 In Roberts, the State's only witness testified against the
defendant in the preliminary hearing. The defense neither asked to have the
witness declared hostile nor cross-examined her.3 8 Roberts was indicted.39
At trial, the witness was unavailable; the State issued five separate subpoenas,
but the witness did not appear. 40 The State offered the transcript from the
witness's preliminary hearing testimony.41
The Court held that the unavailable witness's testimony was admissible
because (1) the witness was unavailable at trial (and the State had made a
31. Chase, supra note 27, at 1040-41.
32. 399 U.S. 149, 150-51 (1970); Chase, supra note 27, at 1041.
33. Chase, supra note 27, at 1043.
34. See id.
35. 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Chase, supra note 27, at 1043.
36. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64; Chase, supra note 27, at 1044.
37. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59-60; Chase, supra note 27, at 1044.
38. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58; Chase, supra note 27, at 1044.
39. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 60; Chase, supra note 27, at 1044.
40. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59; Chase, supra note 27, at 1044.
41. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 60; Chase, supra note 27, at 1044.
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good faith albeit fruitless effort to locate her); and (2) the witness's testimony
had "indicia of reliability" because she had been effectively (if not actually)
cross-examined at the preliminary hearing.42 The Court concluded that this
test satisfied the Founders' objective that face-to-face confrontation with the
accused is an essential right of every criminal defendant.43
The Roberts test of the admissibility of hearsay under the Confrontation
Clause has two prongs: necessity and reliability. 4 The necessity prong is
satisfied by showing the unavailability of the witness; the reliability prong is
satisfied by showing "that the hearsay was admitted pursuant to a firmly
rooted hearsay exception or that it possesses particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 45
The Roberts test became the dominant test in hearsay admissibility for the
next quarter of a century. The Court further refined this test in reference to
child witnesses in the following case before it finally abandoned the Roberts
analysis in Crawford.
B. The Confrontation Clause Under White v. Illinois
In White v. Illinois,46 the Court concluded that the necessity and reliability
prongs of the Roberts analysis were satisfied in a child witness case when the
hearsay statements were given as an excited utterance or in the course of
medical treatment.47
In White, White was charged with the aggravated sexual assault of the
then four-year-old S.G.4 8 S.G. was unable to testify at White's trial.49 On
two separate occasions, the State tried to call her as a witness, but S.G.
"experienced emotional difficulty [en route] to the courtroom and in each
instance left without testifying., 50 When S.G. failed to testify, "[t]he defense
made no attempt to call S.G. as a witness, and the trial court neither made, nor
was asked to make, a finding that S.G. was unavailable to testify."
' 51
The State attempted to admit the testimony of S.G.'s babysitter, mother,
caseworker, and medical provider as to what S.G. had told each of them about
42. Roberts, 448 U.S at 65; Chase, supra note 27, at 1044.
43. Roberts, 448 U.S at 65-66; Chase, supra note 27, at 1044.
44. Chase, supra note 27, at 1044-45.
45. Id. at 1051-52.
46. 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Chase, supra note 27, at 1052.
47. White, 502 U.S. at 350-5 1; Chase, supra note 27, at 1052.
48 White, 502 U.S at 350; Chase, supra note 27, at 1052.
49. White, 502 U.S at 350; Chase, supra note 27, at 1052.
50. White, 502 U.S. at 350; Chase, supra note 27, at 1052.
51. White, 502 U.S. at 350; Chase, supra note 27, at 1052-53.
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the sexual assault.52 Although White objected on hearsay grounds, the trial
court allowed the testimony based on Illinois hearsay exceptions for both
statements made as spontaneous declarations and statements made in the
course of securing medical treatment. 
53
The Supreme Court upheld the admission of this hearsay testimony,
concluding that excited utterances and statements made in the course of
receiving medical treatment are "firmly rooted" exceptions to the hearsay rule
and are therefore reliable.54
In fact, the Court stated that "face-to-face" confrontation with the accuser
during trial was probably less accurate in these special situations; in a time of
emergency or medical care situation, a witness is more likely to unabashedly
tell the truth either because she has not had time to think about a "statement"
previously (emergency situation) or because she fears a misdiagnosis or
mistreatment if she does not tell the truth (medical care). 55
Thus, the White expansion of the Roberts two-pronged necessity and
reliability test included the excited utterance and statements made in the
course of medical treatment exceptions to the rule against hearsay admission.
In 2004, with Crawford, the Roberts test was overruled and the White
analysis is presumably still good law, although with a sometimes murky
application. The next section discusses the Crawford decision.
III. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: THE NEWEST GAME TN TOWN
In March 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically changed its
approach to hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. In Crawford v.
Washington, a 7-2 majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court
reassessed the history, text, and policy underlying a defendant's right to
confront witnesses against him.56 The Court found the Roberts approach of
necessity and reliability lacking. 57  Thus, the Court held that testimonial
hearsay may be used against the accused only when the declarant is
unavailable and the defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine that
declarant.5
8
This section discusses the Crawford decision, the new rule that the
52. White, 502 U.S. at 350; Chase, supra note 27, at 1053.
53. White, 502 U.S. at 350-5 1; Chase, supra note 27, at 1053.
54. White, 502 U.S. at 357; Chase, supra note 27, at 1053.
55. White, 502 U.S. at 356; Chase, supra note 27, at 1054.
56. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
57. Id. at 52.
58. Id. at 57-61.
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Supreme Court made in that decision, and the rationale that led the Court to
the new Crawford rule.
A. The Case
In Crawford, Crawford was charged with assaulting a man who had
allegedly attempted to rape his wife. 59 Crawford claimed self-defense. 60 The
police interrogated Crawford's wife, who was present at the time of the
conflict. 6' His wife's statement generally corroborated Crawford's statement
but suggested that Crawford's conflict with the "victim" may have been more
than self-defense.62
At the trial, the wife claimed marital privilege and refused to testify
against her husband.63 However, the prosecution was allowed to introduce
the wife's recorded statement as a statement against penal interest.64
Crawford was convicted.65 The Washington Supreme Court upheld the
conviction and found that the wife's hearsay statement fulfilled both the
state's evidentiary rules and the defendant's right to confrontation. 66 But the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, rethinking years of Confrontation Clause
precedent and changing the landscape of criminal justice.67
B. The New Rule
The new rule under Crawford states that testimonial hearsay may only be
admitted when: (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify (after the prosecution
made a good faith effort to produce the declarant) and (2) the defendant had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.68
Furthermore, the Court differentiated between testimonial and non-
testimonial hearsay under Crawford.69 The Court explained that testimony is
usually "'[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
59. Id. at 38-41.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 40.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67, Id. at 67-69.
68. Id. at 64.
69. Id. at 50-51.
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establishing or proving some fact."' 70  The Court further explained, "[a]n
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony
in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
not."71 The Court defines testimonial statements as the following:
[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-
that is,, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations,
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, .... "statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.,
72
Although the Court declined to conclusively determine all that falls under
the broad umbrella of testimonial,7 3 police interrogations certainly qualified in
Crawford.74 At this juncture, the Confrontation Clause "places no constraints
at all on the use of ... [the] prior testimonial statements" of the unavailable
witness, which was unchartered territory prior to this decision. 75
C. The Rationale
In creating this new rule in Crawford, the Court examined an extensive
American and British practice of the Confrontation right in order to determine
the proper function of the Confrontation Clause and hearsay in the present
day.76 In considering the history of the Confrontation right in both America
and the United Kingdom before 1791, the Court determined that "the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-
law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused.",
78
70. Id. at 71 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)).
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id. (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal
citations omitted)).
73. Id. at 66-68.
74. Id. at 51.
75. Id. at 51 n.9.
76. Id. at 49-50.
77. Id. at 50.
78. Id.
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Next, the Court noted that the historical record compels a second
proposition: "that the Framers would not have allowed admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination. 79  In Crawford, the defendant never had an opportunity to
cross-examine his wife; thus, the admission of her tape-recorded interrogation
without cross-examination violated Crawford's Sixth Amendment right.80
Finally, the Court determined that the Roberts two-pronged approach of
necessity and reliability is too malleable and therefore inadequate to protect
the Confrontation right.8' First, the Roberts analysis is too broad because "[i]t
applies the same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex
parte testimony. 82 In addition, the Roberts test is also too narrow because
"[i]t admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere
finding of reliability. 83  Thus, defendants get too much protection from
hearsay when the testimony is not ex parte and receive too little when the
testimony is ex parte. The Court's new approach established by Crawford
provides more blanket protection for defendants than did the Roberts
approach.
IV. TESTIMONIAL VERSUS NON-TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS AFTER
CRA WFORD
In abandoning the Roberts test, the Crawford Court analyzed the
definition of testimony and concluded that testimonial statements include
extrajudicial statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
confessions, and statements during police interrogations 84 that occur in a
criminal adjudication. 85  The Court stressed that the difference is that the
79. Id. at 53-54.
80. Id. at 66-68.
81. Id. at 67-68.
82. Id. at 60.
83. Id.; see also Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 2, 5 (2004) [hereinafter Friedman, Adjusting].
84. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-5 1.
85. The Crawford court did not specifically address whether or not its holding applies to civil
or quasi-criminal adjudications, such as parole, probation, sexual predator commitment, civil
commitment, or juvenile proceedings. Moise, supra note 23, at 11. The Crawford court held only
that its decision applies to criminal proceedings. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
Technically, civil litigants do enjoy Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. See Capitol
Mortgage Bankers, Inc. v. Cuomo, 222 F,3d 151, 155-56 (4th Cir. 2000). However, given the Sixth
Amendment's history and the Crawford court's discussion of only criminal proceedings, it seems
unlikely that Crawford will have any significant effect on most civil proceedings. Moise, supra note
23, at 11.
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formal statement an accuser might make to government officials is
testimonial, whereas the casual remark of a person to an acquaintance is non-
testimonial.86 The Court, however, did not conclusively define all hearsay
that is considered testimonial. 87 In this next section, this Note explores the
definitions of "testimonial" and "non-testimonial" after Crawford.
A. Testimonial Hearsay
Legal scholars see different approaches to deeming certain statements
testimonial. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Crawford, cited
favorably to two leading scholars in the area of testimonial declarations-
Professor Akhil Reed Amar of Yale Law School and Professor Richard D.
Friedman of Michigan Law School. 88
Amar defines testimonial statements as statements "'prepared by the
government for in court use and . . . then used in court."' 89 Furthermore,
Amar's approach includes "'government prepared affidavits, depositions,
[and] videotapes,' as well as police-station confessions, which have 'formal
While the Confrontation right does apply to most quasi-criminal proceedings such as probation,
parole, and sexual predator commitments, the Confrontation right is usually applicable in only a
watered-down version under, not the Sixth Amendment, but the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Moise, supra note 23, at 11. In United
States v. Barraza, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2004), the court held that Crawford applied only
to Sixth Amendment rights and was therefore inapplicable to quasi-criminal proceedings such as a
supervised release revocation hearing. Likewise, in Smart v. State, 153 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004), the court held that a community supervision revocation is not a stage of a criminal
prosecution and Crawford is therefore inapplicable. Id. at 120; see Smart v. State, Beaumont Court
of Appeals, 20 TEX. LAW. 46 (Jan. 17, 2005). Similarly, in People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004), the court held that the Sixth Amendment protections afforded in Crawford do
not apply in a probation revocation proceeding. Criminal Practice; Defendants and Accused, Rights
of CAL. SUPREME CT. SERVICE, Oct. 8, 2004.
Juvenile proceedings are another quasi-criminal adjudicative process that does not afford the
parties Confrontation rights. In an Illinois Appellate Court case, the court held that juvenile
proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature and that no Sixth Amendment Confrontation rights were
therefore implicated. Civil Procedure-Hearsay; Trial Court Properly Considered Minor's Out-of-
Court Statement in Case State Filed Against Parent Accused of Child Abuse, CHI. DAILY LAW
BULL., Sept. 1, 2004.
86. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.
87. Id. at 66.
88. Id. at 61; see Paul Shechtman, Outside Counsel: Crawford and the Meaning of Testimonial,
N.Y. LAW J., June 23, 2004, at 23; see also Akhil Reed Amar, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 125-131 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to
Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045 (1998); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998); Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in
Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171 (2002); Professor Friedman was an author of an amicus brief for
Crawford.
89. Shechtman, supra note 88, at 4 (quoting Amar).
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indicia of testimony-response to precise questions, purportedly precise
rendition or transcription or taping, signature and the like."' 90 In fact, Amar's
approach "excludes all 'private accusations made out of court by one private
person to another' from Confrontation Clause coverage."
91
On the other hand, Friedman defines testimonial hearsay more broadly,
determining a statement is testimonial if "the declarant 'makes a statement
[that] she anticipates ... will be used in the prosecution or investigation of the
crime. 51192
The difference between Amar's approach and Friedman's approach is
significant. Under Amar's approach, any statements made to a private citizen
or that are functionally equivalent to testimony, whether they are dying
declarations or 9-1-1 calls, are not testimonial and therefore not subject to the
Crawford analysis. 93  However, under Friedman's approach, a dying
declaration made to a private citizen or a 9-1-1 call detailing the events of a
crime would certainly be testimonial and therefore inadmissible without
producing the declarant at trial.9 4 Depending on which approach the lower
courts and eventually perhaps the Supreme Court adopt in future cases will
significantly alter the future strength of Confrontation Clause's available
protection.
In the lower courts, testimonial hearsay necessarily includes those few
examples iterated by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, many lower courts
have struggled to define other forms of testimonial hearsay.
Several federal appellate courts have tried to hone in on the exact
definition of testimonial hearsay. In United States v. McClain,95 the Second
Circuit noted that testimonial hearsay includes "prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing or other court proceeding, as well as confessions and
responses made during police interrogations[,]" and most definitely a "plea
allocution by a co-conspirator., 96 Likewise, in United States v. Lee,97 the
court interprets testimonial hearsay to include "plea allocutions, grand jury
testimony, prior trial testimony, preliminary hearing testimony, and police
interrogations" as testimonial statements. 98 While lower courts continue to
struggle with the definition of testimonial hearsay, some courts have also
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 377 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2004).
96. Id. at 221-22.
97. 374 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2004).
98. Id. at 644.
2006]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
found problems in the realm of non-testimonial hearsay. The following
section explains non-testimonial hearsay and its status after Crawford.
B. Non-Testimonial Hearsay
Some critics argue that it may be easier to define what is non-testimonial
and therefore admissible (after undergoing a Roberts analysis) rather than
what is testimonial (and subject to the Crawford analysis). For instance, legal
scholar Thomas J. Reed describes a non-testimonial out-of-court statement as
"one that does not directly prove the identity of the accused or an element of
the offense." 99 Another critic, Robert P. Mosteller, posits that the "indicator
[between testimonial and non-testimonial statements] is whether the statement
is made for the purpose of accusing, or whether it is made for another purpose
associated with other ordinary human activities."' 00
Thus, according to many scholars, whether or not a statement is
testimonial depends in large part on its relevance.' 0 ' An out-of-court
statement that directly proves the identity of a defendant or an element of the
offense is testimonial. 0 2  On the other hand, if an out-of-court statement
merely provides circumstantial proof of the identity of a defendant or an
element of an offense, it is deemed non-testimonial. 103
Lower courts have also interpreted testimonial hearsay in different ways.
For example, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that a coroner's
protocol report showing the cause of death of a homicide victim was not
testimonial.10 4  Likewise, in a New York City Criminal Court decision,
People v. Mackey, 105 the court deemed a witness's excited utterance
identifying a suspect to the police while she was in a police patrol van
reporting a crime as non-testimonial. 1
06
Although the majority in Crawford has far from settled this controversy,
lower courts have assumed that the Roberts analysis still applies to non-
testimonial hearsay while the Crawford analysis addresses testimonial
99. Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union:
Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185, 225 (2004).
100. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 547 (2005) (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 549.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Perkins v. State, 897 So. 2d 457, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
105. See Decision of Interest; New York City Criminal Court, Witness' Statements to Police in
Patrol Van Are Not Testimonial Under Crawford, N.Y. LAW J., Dec. 10, 2004, at 19.
106. Id.
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hearsay. 107 Once a statement has been deemed non-testimonial, the courtmust go through a Roberts analysis.' 08
V. WHAT MAKES THE DEFENDANT'S OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE
THE DECLARANT ADEQUATE AND WHEN DOES IT MATTER?
The U.S. Supreme Court's preference is that a witness testifies about his
or her accusation against the defendant at trial. But how much cross-
examination is enough? And sometimes, even when the witness is available
but does not testify at trial, the witness's prior statements are admitted.
Although this is technically a violation of the Confrontation Clause, appellate
courts presumably are able to uphold a conviction on harmless error grounds.
This section explains the Supreme Court's preference-live cross-
examination; the limits on the adequacy of cross-examination; and the
doctrine of harmless error.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a "constitutional preference under the
Confrontation Clause for present testimony" that directly addresses the
accusation made against the defendant. 10 9 In United States v. Owens,"0 the
Court explained that "[o]rdinarily a witness is regarded as 'subject to cross-
examination' when he is placed on the stand [at trial], under oath, and
responds willingly to questions.""'
Furthermore, the Crawford Court preserved the holding of California v.
Green112 that the Confrontation Clause is satisfied when the use of the prior
statements of a witness are accompanied by that witness's presence and cross-
examination at trial.' 13 In Green, the Court stated, "[W]here the declarant is
not absent, but is present to testify and to submit to cross-examination, our
cases, if anything, support the conclusion that the admission of his out-of-
court statements does not create a confrontation problem."'"14 Similarly, in
People v. Argomaniz-Ramirez,1 5 the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that
videotaped testimony of witnesses was admissible because the witnesses were
107. See United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 221 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); but see United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2004).
108. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 12.
109. Mosteller, supra note 100, at 580.
110. 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Mosteller, supra note 100, at 582.
111. Owens, 484 U.S. at 561; Mosteller, supra note 100, at 585.
112. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
113. Id. at 162.
114. Id.
115. 102 P.3d 1015 (Colo. 2004).
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scheduled to testify at trial and would be subjected to cross-examination. 11 6
However, the Court's determination of the adequacy of cross-examination
lies in murkier waters.
Sometimes, the witness is clearly unavailable and the opportunity for
cross-examination is clearly inadequate. In such situations as the self-
incrimination privilege based on the Fifth Amendment, the marital privilege
based on a state's rule of evidence, or significant judicial restrictions on cross-
examination, a witness's statements may not be admitted because the witness
is rendered unavailable for cross-examination. "1
7
Likewise, a witness's refusal to answer questions during direct
examination makes him unavailable. 1"8 On the other hand, mere evasiveness
or loss of memory when testifying on the stand does not necessarily render the
cross-examination of a witness inadequate. 1 9
Finally, courts may uphold a conviction even if hearsay has not been
subjected to the crucible of cross-examination if that hearsay does affect the
outcome of the cases.
Technically, the Crawford Court was silent on the application of harmless
error analysis to the Confrontation right, 120 which lower courts have
interpreted to mean that Crawford leaves unchanged the rule of Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 121 which held that a violation of the Confrontation right may be
deemed harmless and therefore does not require reversal. 
22
For example, in Lee, the defendant contended that Crawford overturned
the "indicia of reliability" prong of Roberts and that all non-testimonial
hearsay must fall within a "firmly rooted" exception. 123 Although the Lee
Court did erroneously allow hearsay testimony at trial without subjecting it to
cross-examination, it deemed the error "harmless" because this error did not
affect the outcome of the case. 124 In other jurisdictions, courts have avoided
use of the harmless error analysis until the Supreme Court rules more
definitively. 1
25
116. Id. at 1018; Child-Witness Statement Out of Court is Admissible, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20,
2004, at 22.
117. Mosteller, supra note 100, at 587.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 587-89.
120. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
121. 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Mosteller, supra note 100, at 551.
122. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 8; see Moody v.
State, 594 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 2004).
123. United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, 645 (8th Cir. 2004); Mosteller, supra note 100, at 551.
124. Lee, 374 F.3d at 645; Mosteller, supra note 100, at 570.
125. Barbara L. Jones, Conviction Reversed on Confrontation Clause Grounds, THE MINN.
LAW., July 12, 2004.
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not definitively resolve the issue,
the rule of thumb is that trial cross-examination of a declarant is required to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 
126
VI. CATEGORIES OF HEARSAY AND THEIR CURRENT STATUS POST-
CRA WFORD
In this section, this Note explains the national trends in regard to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly, and what affect Crawford has on
exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Pre-Crawford, hearsay evidence was admitted during a trial if it had some
indicia of reliability.127 One way a prosecutor could prove reliability was by
showing that the hearsay evidence fit into a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception. 128 In this section, this Note delves into many categories of hearsay
exceptions that were once admitted in trial pre-Crawford and their status as
admissible hearsay post-Crawford. 129 The next few sections explain the
national trends with regard to hearsay exceptions-which hearsay exceptions
are likely to no longer be admissible under the Confrontation Clause; which
exceptions are left in limbo until the U.S. Supreme Court rules on them; and
which exceptions stand comfortably outside the reach of the Confrontation
Clause protections.
126. See id.
127. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65; Chase, supra note 27, at 1044.
128. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66; Chase, supra note 27, at 1051-52.
129. Most lower courts have held that Crawford does not apply retroactively; therefore, this
Note focuses on what exceptions are currently being litigated. However, some critics argue that
Crawford should apply retroactively because it is a "watershed" decision.
In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Supreme Court held that new procedural rulings
were not applicable in the collateral review of convictions that became final before those rulings
were announced. Id. at 311. However, the Teague court also held that there are two exceptions to
this rule: (1) "a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,"' and (2)
new "watershed rules of criminal procedure" that are necessary to the fundamental fairness of the
criminal proceeding should be also applied retroactively. Id.
Under the second exception, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decided Mungo v.
Duncan, 277 F. Supp. 2d 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), holding that the Crawford ruling is not a watershed
rule under Teague and therefore does not apply retroactively. Decision of Interest: 2 nd US. Circuit
Court of Appeals; Crawford Ruling on Hearsay Not Retroactive; It is Not a 'Watershed' Rule Under
Teague Test, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 2005, at 22.
But the story is not over yet. Some legal scholars believe that Crawford may apply under the
Teague court's second exception anyway: "There are numerous references in the majority opinion to
the authors' beliefs that cross-examination is a 'bedrock' principle of a fair trial and the only sure
method of ensuring reliability." Rene L. Valladares & Franny A. Forsman, Crawford v. Washington:
The Confrontation Clause Gets Teeth, 12 NEV. LAW. 12, 16 (2004). It remains to be seen what
position, if any, the Supreme Court will adopt on the Crawford decision's retroactivity.
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A. Common Hearsay Exceptions Likely to Be Abandoned
Although Crawford did not answer many questions about the ways in
which the decision will impact hearsay, the following hearsay exceptions will
likely no longer be recognized as valid hearsay exceptions in criminal cases
under the paradigm of Crawford.
1. Child Witness Statements
Undoubtedly, a problem area of testimonial hearsay arises in the
circumstances of child witnesses.130 Before Crawford, children, particularly
in abuse cases, did not testify at trial or testified via video conferencing. But
with Crawford, the game has changed, although it is uncertain what the new
understanding of a child witness's obligation should be under the
Confrontation Clause.
Presumably, the leading case in the area of child witnesses, Maryland v.
Craig,13 1 is preserved.132 The Craig court held that "upon a particularized
showing that a child witness would be traumatized by having to testify in the
presence of the accused, the child may testify in another room with the judge
and counsel present by the jury and the accused connected electronically."' 133
Craig requires the trial court to find "emotional distress suffered by the child
witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis." 134
One critic opines that Crawford and Craig are able to co-exist peacefully,
because while Crawford determines when confrontation is required, Craig
addresses what procedures confrontation requires. 135 However, not all critics
agree. While many states have statutes allowing children's testimony by
closed circuit television, these statutes may not adequately preserve a
defendant's right to confront witnesses against him. 136
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine which statements by child
witnesses are testimonial, or made in anticipation of litigation. 137 For
130. Peter Adomeit, Raleigh's Revenge: Crawford v. Washington, W. MASS. L. TRIB., Oct. 17,
2004, at 4; see also Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 10.
131. 497 U.S. 836 (1990); Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 8.
132. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 7.
133. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 8.
134. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 8.
135. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 8.
136. See John F. Yetter, Wrestling With Crawford v. Washington and the New Constitutional
Law of Confrontation, 78 FLA. B.J. 26, 30 (2004); Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 10.
137. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 10-11.
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instance, a child might not understand that her "statement, if accepted, is
likely to lead to adverse consequences for the person accused." 138 In addition,
to be testimonial, a child must be able to foresee that the statement he or she
makes not only may have consequences for the accuser but may be used in a
court of law. 
139
In order for a child witness to understand the adverse consequences of his
or her testimony against the defendant, the child must possess a certain level
of maturity and foresight. In practice, though, assessing a child's maturity
level and foresight is difficult. A child's statement to his mother, for instance,
might be plausibly seen by the child as either (1) private and therefore having
no possibility of being passed on or acted upon or (2) active and therefore
encouraging the mother to punish the accuser or act in some way upon the
statement. 140
In addition, maturity and foresight may not be reasonable criteria.1
4 1
Some legal scholars suggest that the only appropriate guide to determine
whether a statement is testimonial is the perspective of a reasonable adult. 142
Under such a standard, Craig would undoubtedly fall.
The current path of Supreme Court jurisprudence is one that seems
unfavorable to preserving Craig. 143 In many lower courts, all child witnesses
are required to testify live and in person in order to secure the admissibility of
their out-of-court statements and uphold the Confrontation right for
defendants. 144
2. Domestic Violence Victims' Statements
A close counterpart to children's testimony is that of victim witnesses
testifying in domestic abuse cases. Both child witnesses and domestic
violence victim witnesses are likely to feel particularly intimidated by the
defendants they accuse of abuse if those accusations are indeed truthful.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id. at 10; see also Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the
Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1282 (2003).
140. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 11.
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id.; see also People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev. denied,
2004 Cal. LEXIS 7682 (2004).
143. See Katherine W. Grearson, Proposed Uniform Child Witness Testimony Act: An
Impermissible Abridgement of Criminal Defendants'Rights, 45 B.C. L. REv. 467 (2004).
144. See People ex rel. R.A.S., Ill P.3d 487 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d
258 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); see also
Child-Witness Statement Out of Court is Admissible, supra note 116, at 22; Friedman, Adjusting,
supra note 83, at 11; Jones, supra note 125; Mosteller, supra note 100, at 590-94.
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Before Crawford, courts often admitted reliable testimony from domestic
violence victims even when the witnesses were not available to testify at trial
under hearsay exceptions. However, Crawford has changed the admissibility
of domestic violence victim witness statements.
After Crawford, courts will likely no longer admit a victim's statements
made to the police if the victim refuses to testify at trial. 145 For instance, in a
California court case, People v. Adams, 146 Adams cut the face of his pregnant
girlfriend with a drinking glass and threatened her life. 147  Adams was
subsequently charged with assault and uttering a threat. 148 His girlfriend, the
victim, was "willfully unavailable" at trial. 149 Although her statements were
allowed and Adams was convicted, his conviction was later overturned as a
violation of his Confrontation right. 1
50
Lower courts continue to interpret domestic violence victim's statements
similarly, rarely allowing the "excited utterance" hearsay exception to
swallow testimonial statements that the victim witness later recants. In
People v. Zarazua, 5' a domestic violence victim allowed her testimony to be
videotaped by a police officer approximately one and a half hours after an
alleged rape. 152 At trial, the court admitted the videotape even though the
victim recanted her testimony and refused to testify in court.'53 The
California appellate court overturned the defendant's conviction because his
Confrontation right was violated by admitting the videotape. 154
After Crawford, domestic violence victims will be required to testify at
trial in order to allow any prior, un-cross-examined testimony to be admitted.
B. Hearsay Exceptions Left in the Gray Area
The U.S. Supreme Court left most hearsay exceptions to be decided by the
lower courts. The following is a sampling of the most hotly contested areas of
hearsay exceptions and their current status. These exceptions, for the most
part, remain in limbo throughout the nation.
145. Adomeit, supra note 130, at 4.
146. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
147. Id. at 239.
148. Id. at 238.
149. Id. at 240.
150. Id. at 238.
151. C040891, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3831 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004).
152. Mosteller, supra note 100, at 534.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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1. Co-Conspirators' Statements
Before Crawford, the co-conspirator exemption to the hearsay rule
allowed the statements of co-conspirators to be admitted at trial even when
those co-conspirators were unavailable to testify. Although the Crawford
Court blanketly deemed conspirators' statements to be non-testimonial and
thus admissible, this is difficult to assure in practice. 155 The Crawford Court
noted that co-conspirator statements are those made "in furtherance of a
conspiracy."' 156 Because co-conspirator statements are similar to and usually
based upon prior statements of the defendant or the defendant's agent,
157
these statements continue to be admitted under a hearsay exception (after the
court finds the Roberts test of necessity and reliability is satisfied). 158
A co-conspirator's statements to a confidential informant, 59 to family
members, 16  and to acquaintances 161 are non-testimonial and therefore
admissible.162 In United States v. Saget, the court determined that hearsay is
testimonial if the declarant is reasonably aware or expects that his or her
testimony may later be used at trial.163 Thus, the Saget court concluded that
"a declarant's statements to a confidential informant, whose true status is
unknown to the declarant, do not constitute testimony within the meaning of
Crawford." '164  Likewise, in United States v. Lee, a co-conspirator's
155. Reed, supra note 99, at 225.
156. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
157. Steven M. Biskupic, Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, 77 WIS. LAW. 16, 18 (2004);
see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 73-74 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
158. In the terrorism context, Crawford also has a potentially significant application. The
Confrontation right as interpreted in Crawford may apply in the following way: "(1) it can
dramatically restrict the type of evidence that the government can introduce against a defendant-
detainee; (2) it can preclude the use of secret, ex parte evidence and proceedings; (3) it can, for
detainees subject to military commissions, provide an independent, normative doctrinal foundation
for the application of Confrontation Clause principles regardless whether the United States
Constitution applies to a particular proceeding; and (4) it can provide a rationale for obtaining
exculpatory information from persons in U.S. custody (but who are not available as witnesses),
without also risking admission of inculpatory statements from those persons." Joshua L. Dratel, The
Impact ofCrawford v. Washington on Terrorism Prosecutions, 28 CHAMPION 19 (2004). Although
not within the scope of this Article, the Crawford decision's implications on terrorism may
significantly alter the way in which federal prosecutors go about pitting suspects against each other
in order to elicit testimony. See id.
159. United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2004).
160. United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2004).
161. United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 838, 838 n.l (8th Cir. 2004).
162. See Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 7-8.
163. Saget, 377 F.3d at 231.
164. Id. at 229.
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statements to his brother and mother were not testimonial. 165 Also, in United
States v. Manfre, "comments ... made to loved ones or acquaintances... are
not the kind of memorialized, judicial-process-created evidence of which
Crawford speaks" 166 and are thus non-testimonial and admissible without the
declarant's presence at trial.
But co-conspirator statements can be testimonial in certain circumstances
and therefore inadmissible without the declarant testifying at trial. For
instance, an accomplice's redacted confession to police is testimonial and thus
inadmissible. 167 In addition, co-conspirator's identification of a third person
as a member of the conspiracy is deemed testimonial and inadmissible
without the declarant testifying at trial. 168 Furthermore, a co-conspirator's
statement that "directly proves another conspirator committed an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy" is testimonial. 169  Finally, "even if the
conspirator were available as a witness because he was offered immunity
from prosecution, the 'testimonial' statements would still be inadmissible."' 7 °
Therefore, while most co-conspirator statements are non-testimonial and
therefore admissible (after going through Roberts analysis), a blanket
assertion about the admissibility of co-conspirators' statements seems
impossible at this point. The U.S. Supreme Court must first give a working
definition of testimonial.
2. Business Records
Under Crawford, business records are a hearsay exception that does not
involve testimonial evidence and thus does not require the Sixth Amendment
right of Confrontation. 7 1 The Court's reference to business records may lend
"support to other existing hearsay exceptions on prior writings or recordings,
such as recorded recollections, medical records, and public documents." 
172
In People v. Johnson,173 the California Supreme Court held that a
laboratory report does not require the lab technician's presence in court and
testimony in order to be admitted. The lab report, the court held, is not in fact
hearsay: "[a] laboratory report does not 'bear testimony,' or function as the
165. Lee, 374 F.3d at 644.
166. Manfre, 368 F.3d at 838 n.1.
167. United States v. Jones, 371 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004).
168. Reed, supra note 99, at 225.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
172. Biskupic, supra note 157, at 2.
173. 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230 (Cal Ct. App. 2004).
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equivalent of in-court testimony."' i14 Because the laboratory report was not a
substitute for live testimony, the court determined it was non-testimonial and
therefore admissible under a Roberts analysis. 175 Nevertheless, some critics
believe that laboratory reports in criminal cases generally should be
considered testimonial. 
176
3. 9-1-1 Calls
Before Crawford, 9-1-1 calls were usually admissible because they held
sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, which satisfied the reliability prong of
the Roberts analysis. As long as the witness was unavailable, the 9-1-1 call
testimony was usually admitted under this firmly rooted hearsay exception.
Courts reasoned that people calling for help were not testifying, but merely
trying to save their own lives.
Post-Crawford, 9-1-1 calls have been sometimes still held non-testimonial
because these calls are cries for help rather than an avenue to set the scene for
litigation. 177 In Moscat, the court explained the reasoning for allowing 9-1-1
calls as non-testimonial evidence during the trial: "Typically, a woman who
calls 911 for help because she has just been stabbed or shot is not
contemplating being a 'witness' in future legal proceedings; she is usually
trying simply to save her own life."
' 178
While in some cases a 9-1-1 caller is simply trying to get medical
attention, not all cases repeat this scenario. In some instances, a caller's
motives may be to trigger the investigative and prosecutorial functions.
179
Still, other callers may have both objectives-both medical attention and
future criminal litigation-in mind when they place their calls and therefore
may have "planned" these emergency calls.' 80  For example, in State v.
Davis,181 the 9-1-1 caller reported to the operator that she had been beaten in
her home by a man whom she had a restraining order against and that he had
then left her house.'1 82 Although she did not testify at trial, the caller's 9-1-1
174. Criminal Practice: Defendants and Accused, Rights of supra note 85.
175. Id.
176. See Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 11.
177. See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
178. Id. at 880; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 10.
179. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 8.
180. Id.
181. 64 P.3d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 547 (2005); Friedman,
Adjusting, supra note 83, at 9.
182. Davis, 64 P.3d at 663; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 10.
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tape was admitted into evidence. 183
On the other hand, some courts will no longer admit such 9-1-1 testimony
after Crawford.184 In People v. Cortes,185 a New York appellate court held
that 9-1-1 calls that "report a crime" are testimonial for confrontation
purposes. 186
While a case-by-case approach seems the only real framework that
Crawford has given in the realm of 9-1-1 calls, Professors Friedman and
Bridget McCormack suggest the following approach to 9-1-1 calls:
To the extent the call itself is part of the incident being
tried, the fact of the call presumably should be admitted so
the prosecution can present a coherent story about the
incident. But even in that situation, the need to present a
coherent story does not necessarily justify admitting the
contents of the call. And even if the circumstances do
warrant allowing the prosecution to prove the contents of the
call, those contents generally should not be admitted to prove
the truth of what they assert. If the contents of the call are
probative on some ground other than to prove the truth of the
caller's report of what has happened, then admissibility
should be limited to such other ground. To the extent that the
contents of the call are significant only as the caller's report
of what has happened, such a report usually should be
considered testimonial. 1
8 7
Despite Friedman's suggested framework, lower courts usually admit 9-1-
1 calls only if they are in the context of getting immediate emergency help.
4. Excited Utterances
Excited utterances are related to 9-1-1 calls in that courts pre-Crawford
usually regarded a "spontaneous" statement as inherently reliable because the
declarant had no opportunity to consider his or her outburst and was merely
183. Davis, 64 P.3d at 667; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 10.
184. People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004); Friedman, Adjusting, supra
note 83, at 10.
185. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 402; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 10.
186. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 402-03; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 10.
187. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 88, at 1243 (reprinted in Friedman, Adjusting, supra
note 83, at 10).
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reacting to a situation. An excited utterance could be given to law
enforcement, medical providers, or common citizens and still be admitted in
court as reliable statements.
Post-Crawford, excited utterances are still admitted, although it is often
difficult to draw a bright line between a spontaneous statement to the police
and an interrogation by the police. Courts throughout the country have held
that responses to police during a preliminary field investigation are non-
testimonial statements under Crawford. 188 However, answers to direct
investigatory questions by police are usually considered testimonial. 
89
For example, in People v. Mackey,' 90 a New York trial court decision, the
victim waived down a police van; the victim went inside the van and told the
police her boyfriend had beaten her.' 9' As the victim was describing her
attacker, the boyfriend passed in sight of the van; the victim yelled, "[T]here
he goes!"' 192  The Mackey court held that these statements were non-
testimonial and therefore admissible under the "excited utterance" hearsay
exception. 193
Generally, excited utterances are admitted as long as they do not seem to
be uttered with litigation in mind or in response to direct investigatory
questions by police, which a reasonable person would believe to be made in
anticipation of litigation.
5. Where 9-1-1 Calls and Excited Utterances Overlap: A Supreme Solution in
Sight?
On October 31, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in two
cases, 194 Davis v. Washington 95 and Hammon v. Indiana.1 96  Davis was
referenced in the preceding section of this Note under the admissibility of 9-1 -
I calls; the case of Hammon "involves accusatory statements made to a
responding officer" that were admitted as an excited utterance. 97 In both
188. Decision of Interest; People v. Reginald Mackey; Witness' Statements to Police in Patrol
Van are Not Testimonial Under Crawford, N.Y. LAW J., Dec. 10, 2004.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Richard D. Friedman, Cert Granted in Davis and Hammon, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG,
Oct. 31, 2005, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/10/cert-granted-in-davis-and-hammon.ht-
ml [hereinafter Friedman, Cert Granted].
195. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 547 (2005).
196. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 552 (2005).
197. Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note 194.
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cases, "the state supreme courts held that the statements at issue were non-
testimonial" and convicted both defendants. 198 The arguments for both cases
will occur together in the spring of 2006.199 These cases give the Supreme
Court the opportunity to address the definition of testimonial (at least in the
context of 9-1-1 calls and excited utterance).
In Davis, the alleged domestic violence victim called 9-1-1 in February
2001 and said that someone had just beaten her.200 The victim remained on
the line; she responded to the questions of the 9-1-1 operator about the alleged
crime and identified Adrian Davis (who had already left the scene) as the
perpetrator. 201  When police arrived, they noticed fresh injuries on the
victim's forearm and face.
202
At trial, the victim was not called to testify. 20 3 The 9-1-1 tape was
admitted, however, and was the only evidence that identified Davis as the
perpetrator.20 4
The Washington Supreme Court held that the victim's statement was not
testimonial. 20 5  The majority's reasoning was that she had called 9-1-1
because she was in immediate danger, not to assist police in an
investigation. 206
In Hammon, police responded to a domestic abuse call from the home of
Hershel and Amy Hammon. °7 When the police arrived at the home, Amy
denied any problem; in another room, Hershel told police there had been only
an argument and things were now fine.208
Later at the scene, Amy responded to questions about the incident and told
officers that Hershel had punched her twice in the chest and thrown her to the
ground. 20 9  Amy then filled out a form affidavit, which laid out statutory
198. Id.; see also Hammon, 829 N.E.2d 444; Davis, 111 P.3d 844; Friedman, Cert Granted,
supra note 194.
199. Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note 194.
200. Davis, 111 P.3d at 846; Leonard Post, Eyes on Clarifying Crawford, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24,
2005, at 1; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note 194.
201. Davis, 111 P.3d at 846; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note 194.
202. Davis, 111 P.3d at 847; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note 194.
203. Davis, 111 P.3d at 847; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note 194.
204. Davis, 111 P.3d at 847; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note 194.
205. Davis, 111 P.3d at 851; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note 194.
206. Davis, 11 P.3d at 851; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note 194.
207. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005); Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert
Granted, supra note 194.
208. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 446-47; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra
note 194.
209. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note
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battery allegations, and wrote a specific description of the incident. 210  The
affidavit form indicated that the investigating officer would use the affidavit
to establish probable cause for an arrest. 211  Hershel was charged with
battery.212
At the trial, Amy was subpoenaed but did not appear. 13 The judge
allowed the officers to testify to Amy's statements as an excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule and admitted Amy's affidavit as a present sense
impression exception to the hearsay rule. 14 Hershel was convicted.21 5
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the state supreme courts
adequately reasoned these two cases in the spring of 2006.
C. Hearsay Exceptions Likely to Remain Unchanged
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on many hearsay exceptions, some
exceptions comfortably sit under both the limited Roberts analysis and the
Crawford analysis. The following discussion explains the hearsay exceptions
that are likely to remain unchanged after Crawford.
1. Statements Resulting from Police Interrogations
Under Crawford, in most jurisdictions, police questioning is generally
considered testimonial, but must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 21 6 In
Crawford, the court noted that "structured police questioning qualifies [as
testimonial interrogation] under any conceivable definition. 2 17 This hearsay
exception is likely to remain unchanged-any statement made to a
government agent in anticipation of litigation will be considered testimonial
and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause.
However, initial investigatory questioning has been considered non-
210. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note
194.
211. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 448; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note
194.
212. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note
194.
213. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note
194.
214. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note
194.
215. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 457; Post, supra note 200; Friedman, Cert Granted, supra note
194.
216. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004); Post, supra note 200.
217. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
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testimonial in some jurisdictions, such as Indiana in State v. Hammon.21s The
rule of thumb, by which most jurisdictions abide, is that statements in the
context of 9-1-1 calls and police investigation should be adjudged testimonial
on a case-by-case basis.
219
For instance, in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,220 an alleged domestic
violence victim made statements at the scene. 221  The court held that
"questioning by law enforcement agents, whether police, prosecutors, or
others acting directly on their behalf, other than to secure a volatile scene or to
establish the need for or provide medical care, is interrogation in the
colloquial sense," and was thus testimonial under Crawford.222  The court
noted that interrogation includes "'investigatory interrogation,' such as
preliminary fact gathering and assessment [of] whether a crime has taken
place. 223 The court added that a statement made in response to "questioning
by law enforcement agents to secure a volatile scene or establish the need for
or provide medical care" is not necessarily non-testimonial but rather should
be determined through a case-by-case inquiry as to "whether a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would anticipate the statement's being used
against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime., 22 4
2. Statements Made in the Course of Medical Treatment
While statements to police as part of an interrogation are testimonial,
generally, statements made to a medical examiner are generally non-
testimonial. 225  The reason for admitting statements made for purposes of
medical treatment is that lying would provide no advantage to the declarant; a
declarant's only interest, at that moment, is receiving appropriate medical
attention.
218. 829 N.E.2d 444. In this case, the alleged victim of domestic violence responded to initial
investigatory questions posed to her by the police. Id. at 447. The victim did not testify at trial, but
her statements to the police were admitted as non-testimonial hearsay. Id. Hammon was
subsequently convicted. Id. at 447.
219. Post, supra note 200.
220. 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005).
221. Id. at 552-53.
222. Id. at 555-56; see also Richard D. Friedman, Fresh Accusations-Interesting
Developments, Useful in Part, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG, Sept. 14, 2005, http://confrontationrigh-
t.blogspot.com/2005/09/fresh-accusations-interesting.html [hereinafter Friedman, Fresh
Accusations].
223. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 556; see also Friedman, Fresh Accusations, supra note 222.
224. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 558 (quoting United States v. Cramer, 389 F.3d 662, 667 (6th
Cir. 2004) (emphasis in Gonsalves omitted)); see also Friedman, Fresh Accusations, supra note 222.
225. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992); Chase, supra note 27, at 1053.
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In State v. Castilla,226 a Washington appellate court decision, a rape
victim's statements for purposes of medical treatment that she had been
touched sexually were non-testimonial hearsay statements and therefore
admissible without the declarant testifying at trial (after undergoing the
Roberts analysis).227 In this case, it appears that this exception is unusually
clear-cut, regardless of the Crawford decision.
Because most statements made to medical providers are usually
confidential and made without litigation in mind, courts generally allow these
statements as non-testimonial hearsay.228 The Roberts analysis is then applied
to non-testimonial hearsay to determine its necessity and reliability.
229
3. Expert Testimony
Pre-Crawford, an expert may testify in court to his or her opinion and may
base that opinion, at least in part, upon inadmissible hearsay statements.
230
Sometimes, "though a statement made to the expert might appear to be
testimonial in nature, because made in anticipation of prosecutorial use, the
prosecution will argue that the statement is not being offered for the truth of
what it asserts but only as a basis for the expert's opinion. 2 31  Crawford
preserves the rule that hearsay in support of an expert's opinion is generally
admissible because it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.232
Thus, the expert's opinion and the hearsay upon which it is based should be
admissible at trial under Crawford as well.23 3
However, some courts disagree. In People v. Thomas,234 Melvin Thomas
was charged with participating in a criminal street gang. 235 A deputy sheriff
testified as an expert on gangs.236 The deputy sheriff testified that Thomas
was a member of a gang called E.Y.C. based upon various sources, including
226. 87 P.3d 1211 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004); Chase, supra note 27, at 1053.
227. Castilla, 87 P.3d at 1215; Chase, supra note 27, at 1053.
228. White, 502 U.S. at 356; Chase, supra note 27, at 1053.
229. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 221 n.1; United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223,
233; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 12.
230. FED. R. EVID. 703.
231. Richard D. Friedman, The Expert Opinion Problem, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG, July 5,
2005, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/07/expert-opinion-problem.html [hereinafter
Friedman, The Expert Opinion].
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Friedman, The Expert Opinion, supra note 231.
235. Thomas, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 583; Friedman, The Expert Opinion, supra note 231.
236. Thomas, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 583; see also Friedman, The Expert Opinion, supra note 231.
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otherwise inadmissible hearsay sources.23 7 The court held that this testimony
was admissible and convicted Thomas.238
On the other hand, on December 20, 2005, the New York Court of
Appeals, the highest court in the state, issued a decision with the opposite
result in People v. Goldstein.239 In Goldstein, the defendant allegedly pushed
a woman he did not know to her death in front of an approaching subway
train. 240 Goldstein raised a defense of insanity; the State responded by
presenting the testimony of a forensic psychiatrist. 24' This psychiatrist
testified that in her opinion, Goldstein was sane at the time; the psychiatrist
substantially relied upon otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements to arrive
at this conclusion. 242
The court held that the Confrontation Clause required exclusion of those
inadmissible hearsay statements.243 In so doing, the court rejected the
argument that the statements were not offered for the truth of what they
asserted but only in support of the psychiatrist's opinion: The court reasoned,
"[T]he statements provided no support for the [psychiatrist's] opinion unless
244they were true. The court opined that in this instance, "The distinction
between a statement offered for its truth and a statement offered to shed light
on an expert's opinion is not meaningful. ,,4
The court also held that the statement was testimonial because the
psychiatrist was hired by the state to testify, and the court inferred that the
interviewees should reasonably have understood that she was involved in trial
preparation.246 Finally, the court concluded that the error of admitting the
psychiatrist's testimony and the hearsay statements to support the
237. Thomas, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 584-85; see also Friedman, The Expert Opinion, supra note
231.
238. Thomas, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 587; see also Friedman, The Expert Opinion, supra note 231.
239. People v. Goldstein, No. 155, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389 (N.Y. Dec. 20, 2005); Richard D.
Friedman, The Expertise End Run and People v. Goldstein, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG, Dec. 24,
2005, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/12/expertise-end-run-and-people-v.html [hereinaf-
ter Friedman, Expertise End Run].
240. Goldstein, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389, at * 1; Friedman, Expertise End Run, supra note 239.
241. Goldstein, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389, at *1; Friedman, Expertise End Run, supra note 239.
242. Goldstein, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389, at *2; Friedman, Expertise End Run, supra note 239.
243. Goldstein, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389, at *21-22; Friedman, Expertise End Run, supra note
239.
244. Goldstein, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389, at *12-13; Friedman, Expertise End Run, supra note
239.
245. See Goldstein, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389, at * 13; Friedman, Expertise End Run, supra note
239.
246. See Goldstein, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389, at * 15; Friedman, Expertise End Run, supra note
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psychiatrist's opinion was not harmless and reversed the conviction.247
Thus, post-Crawford, it is unclear whether an expert's testimony may be
substantially based upon otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence and when
the Confrontation right is triggered. Most courts, however, still recognize that
statements that are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted are
admissible hearsay statements.
4. Dying Declarations
Pre-Crawford, "dying declarations" were admitted in trial under a hearsay
exception. Ostensibly, dying declarations likely still constitute an exception
under Crawford; however, some critics continue to discuss this hearsay
exception as an area of possible change.248
Although dying declarations are generally considered reliable because a
dying person presumably has no reason to lie, some critics see dying
declarations as a controversial area. Friedman suggests that a dying
declaration should generally not be afforded a special exception under the
hearsay rule. 249  He explains that in the case of a dying declaration, "the
purpose of the communication is presumably not merely to edify the listener,
but rather to pass on to the authorities the victim's identification of the killer,
and the understanding of both parties to the communication is that listener
will play his or her role. 25°
Regardless of Friedman's opinion, most courts admit testimony in the
form of a dying declaration.25'
5. Forfeiture
Under the doctrine of forfeiture, a technically testimonial statement may
be admitted because the accused forfeited the Confrontation right when he or
she caused a witness's "unavailability. 252  This section discusses a
247. Goldstein, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389, at *21-22; Friedman, Expertise End Run, supra note
239.
248. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004); Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83,
at 9.
249. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 9.
250. Id.
251. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6; see also People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956 (Cal. 2004);
People v. Jiles, 122 Cal. App. 4th 504 (Cal. App. 2004); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004);
State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 2005); Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 9.
252. Crawford upholds the ruling in United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), which stated
that the memory loss of a witness at trial regarding the accusation or underlying incident does not
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defendant's forfeiture of his or her Confrontation right in the event that he or
she intentionally intimidated or harmed the declarant.
After Crawford, the forfeiture exception to hearsay statements likely still
stands. One critic writes, "Although the facts in Crawford did not involve
forfeiture by wrongdoing, the Court, in passing, made clear that when a
criminal defendant wrongfully prevents witnesses from testifying, his conduct
'extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.' ' 253
This is not the whole story, however. Friedman suggests several pressing
concerns:
If a witness is murdered shortly before he or she was
scheduled to testify against the accused, what showing of the
accused's involvement does the prosecution have to make?..
• [I]s the mere fact that the accused benefited from the murder
enough to raise a presumption at least that the accused
acquiesced in it? ... Suppose the wrongful act that allegedly
rendered the witness unavailable is the same as the act with
which the accused is charged. May it nevertheless cause a
forfeiture of the confrontation right?
254
Friedman acknowledges that the Crawford Court did affirm a forfeiture
exception to hearsay but did not address the questions he poses; nonetheless,
Friedman offers a simple solution: "[I]f a defendant renders a witness
unavailable by wrongful means, the accused cannot complain validly about
the witness's absence at trial. 2 55  Under the forfeiture exception to the
hearsay rule, the testimony of a witness who was unavailable due to the
defendant's purposeful conduct will always be admitted.
256
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on hearsay
exceptions, lower courts have been busy interpreting the Crawford decision
and applying the results to current cases.257 Only the future will resolve the
gray areas of hearsay exceptions.
render that witness unavailable for cross-examination. Id. at 560-61. While forgetfulness, sickness,
or evasive behavior will not render a witness "unavailable," a witness's complete refusal to answer
questions can make him or her unavailable. Mosteller, supra note 100, at 586-87; see also Delaware
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
253. Honorable Paul W. Grimm & Jerome E. Deise, Jr., Hearsay, Confrontation, and
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: Crawford v. Washington, a Reassessment of the Confrontation Clause,
35 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 8-9 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62).
254. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 12.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Post, supra note 200.
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VII. WISCONSIN AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Wisconsin adheres to the Federal Rules of Evidence, codified in the
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence at section 908 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
Clearly, then, Crawford's significance extends directly to Wisconsin
jurisprudence, and this section discusses the effect of Crawford on Wisconsin
by explaining the case law that has emerged in Wisconsin since the Crawford
decision and the changes that will likely happen to the evidentiary statutes.
A. The Old Rule in Wisconsin
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, Wisconsin courts have also determined the
admissibility of hearsay testimony based upon a showing of the witness's
unavailability and the reliability of the witness's statements.258 In Hickman,
the court summarized the Wisconsin approach to hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause:
The threshold question is whether the evidence fits with a
recognized hearsay exception. If not, the evidence must be
excluded. If so, the confrontation clause must be considered.
There are two requisites to satisfaction of the confrontation
right. First, the witness must be unavailable. Second, the
evidence must bear some indicia of reliability. If the evidence
fits within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, reliability can
be inferred and the evidence is generally admissible. This
inference of reliability does not, however, make the evidence
admissible per se. The trial court must still examine the case
to determine whether there are unusual circumstances which
may warrant exclusion of the evidence. If the evidence does
not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it can be
admitted only upon a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 259
Like the federal approach, Wisconsin also followed the Roberts test of
necessity and reliability. In the next section, this Article discusses how
Crawford implicates Wisconsin case law.
258. See State v. Hickman, 513 N.W.2d 657, 660 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); Daniel D. Blinka,
The Confrontation Right and the Hearsay Rule, in 7 Wis. PRAC. EVID. § 802.3 (2d ed. 2004).
259. 513 N.W.2d at 660 n.1.
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B. Wisconsin Gets in the Game
Because Wisconsin has adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence and
because the Sixth Amendment applies to the states through incorporation in
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, Wisconsin must also
adhere to the Crawford decision. In the following sections, this Note
discusses the preliminary decisions to have come from Wisconsin courts
implicating Crawford.
1. A Wisconsin Case in Federal Court that Implicates Crawford
In a Wisconsin case decided ultimately on habeas corpus grounds in the
federal district court, Murillo v. Frank,2 60 a Wisconsin appellate court was
overruled based on Confrontation Clause analysis under Crawford.
In Murillo, an inmate claimed that his Confrontation rights were violated
when the trial court admitted his brother's un-cross-examined statement
implicating him in a murder.261 Although his brother refused to testify at his
trial, the police officer who originally had taken the brother's statement
concerning the murder testified at trial.262 The court admitted the statement
under the social interest exception.263 Murillo was convicted, and the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld his conviction, although it noted that the
"social interest exception" was not a firmly rooted hearsay exception.264 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review of the case.2 65
The court held that the admission of the statement was not harmless error
and that it did indeed violate Murillo's Confrontation rights.266 Although the
court held that Crawford does not apply retroactively and Murillo's case was
final before Crawford was decided,267 his conviction was still reversed.268
The court held that the brother's testimony still violated Murillo's
Confrontation right because it did not fit into any firmly rooted hearsay
exception recognized prior to Crawford.269
260. 316 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
261. Id. at 746-47.
262. Id. at 747.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 748.
266. Id. at 756-57.
267. Id. at 749-50.
268. Id. at 757.
269. Id. at 755-56.
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2. State v. Hale: The First Wisconsin State Decision to Implicate Crawford
In the first Wisconsin Supreme Court decision implicating Crawford, the
court held that the testimony was inadmissible under Crawford but that the
error was harmless.27° In State v. Hale,27' the court upheld a conviction for
two counts of first-degree intentional homicide.272 Although the court held
that un-cross-examined testimony in Hale violated the defendant's
Confrontation rights, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
was harmless.
273
In a trial for his brother-in-law two months prior to the Hale trial, Hale's
brother-in-law, Jones, was convicted of first-degree double homicide, party to
a crime, partly on the testimony of Hale's longtime friend and supplier of the
murder weapon, Sullivan. 74 Sullivan was scheduled to testify at Hale's trial
two months later but was unavailable.275 The court admitted Sullivan's
testimony from Jones' trial anyway because the court reasoned that Hale had
similar interests to Jones in cross-examining Sullivan.276
Although the State's star witness was unable to identify Hale as the
second gunman in the double homicide, the State presented a strong
circumstantial case against Hale. 77  Furthermore, Hale's defense at trial
consisted of admitting that Sullivan's testimony about the murder weapon was
true and invoking an alibi defense.278 On this basis, the court determined that
although Hale's right to Confrontation had been violated, the error was
harmless and Hale would have been convicted anyway.279
3. State v. Manuel and Excited Utterances
In State v. Manuel,280 the court deemed that Crawford was not applicable
because the statement at issue was an excited utterance and thus non-
testimonial. In Manuel, a man (Stamps) flagged down a car and watched the
270. State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637.
271. Id., 1,277 Wis. 2d 593, 1,691 N.W.2d 637, 1.
272. Id., 78, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 78, 691 N.W.2d 637, 78.
273. Id., 277 Wis. 2d 593, 78, 691 N.W.2d 637, 78.
274. Id., 25, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 25, 691 N.W.2d 637, 25.
275. Id., 128, 277 Wis. 2d 593, T 28, 691 N.W.2d 637, 1 28.
276. Id., 31, 277 Wis. 2d 593, T 31, 691 N.W.2d 637, 31.
277. Id., 64, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 64, 691 N.W.2d 637, 64.
278. Id., 65-66, 277 Wis. 2d 593, $T 65-66, 691 N.W.2d 637, TT 65-66.
279. Id., T 78, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 78, 691 N.W.2d 637, 78.
280. 2004 WI App. 111, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 685 N.W.2d 525.
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defendant shoot the driver of the car.28' Stamps then told his girlfriend to take
their kids to a hotel for a few days because he had witnessed Manuel shooting
a man.
282
After Stamps was arrested, Stamps' girlfriend gave a statement to police
about what her boyfriend said he had witnessed.283 At trial, Stamps invoked
his privilege against self-incrimination, and Stamps' girlfriend claimed that
she did not remember the statement when she was called to testify.284 The
court allowed the police officer who had taken the girlfriend's testimony to
testify at trial; the court held this statement was admissible as a statement of
"recent perception" under section 908.045(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes.285
Manuel was convicted. 286
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld Manuel's conviction because
Stamps' "statement to his girlfriend [was made] in good faith and not in
contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation. 287 Furthermore, the court
held that "the circumstances surrounding [the witness's] statement to his
girlfriend render it sufficiently reliable that cross-examining ... [the witness]
would be of 'marginal utility.'
288
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed this decision, reasoning that
Stamps' statements to his girlfriend were not testimonial under Crawford.289
Applying the Roberts analysis of necessity and reliability, the court found that
while a statement of recent perception is not a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, "Manuel's confrontation rights were not violated because Stamps'
statements contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 29 °  These
guarantees of trustworthiness are that Stamps' statements to his girlfriend
were not made "in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim;"' 29' the statements were made in
281. Id., 77 2-4, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 2-4 , 685 N.W.2d 525, TT 2-4.
282. Id., 3, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 3, 685 N.W.2d 525, 3.
283. Id., 4, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 4, 685 N.W.2d 525, 4.
284. Id., TT 3-4, 275 Wis. 2d 146, TT 3-4, 685 N.W.2d 525, TT 3-4.
285. Id., 3, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 3, 685 N.W.2d 525, 3.
286. Id., 5, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 5, 685 N:W.2d 525, 5.
287. Id., 13, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 13, 685 N.W.2d 525, 13.
288. Id., 28, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 28, 685 N.W.2d 525, 28 (citations omitted).
289. Id., 3, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 3, 685 N.W.2d 525, 3. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
recognized and adopted the three formulations of "testimonial" hearsay in Crawford: (1) '"[e]x-parte
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent"'; (2) '"[e]xtrajudicial statements ... contained in
formalized testimonial materials'; and (3) "'[sltatements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial."' State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, 37, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 37, 97 N.W.2d 811, 37
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)).
290. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, 76, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 76, 697 N.W.2d 811, 76.
291. Id., 31,281 Wis. 2d554, 31,697N.W.2d811, 31.
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good faith; 292 and the statements were not made in "contemplation of pending
or anticipated litigation. 293
4. State v. King and Harmless Error
In State v King,294 King and his brother allegedly raped, beat, and robbed
two women-Shelia J. and Chandra T.--on November 29, 2002, and
December 7, 2002, respectively. 295  King was convicted by a jury of
"substantial battery of Shelia J .... and substantial battery and armed robbery
of Chandra T.' ' 29 6 Chandra T. testified at trial, but Shelia J. did not show up;
Sheila J.'s preliminary hearing testimony and statements to medical providers
and police were introduced through hearsay exceptions.297
At the trial, Shelia J. was found unavailable to testify because the State
attempted to serve her with a subpoena seven times. 298 However, the trial
court, upon a post-conviction motion, reversed the finding that Shelia was
unavailable because a detective did in fact talk to Shelia prior to the trial date
and merely tried to "persuade" her to attend the trial, without serving her with
a subpoena. 299 The trial court found, and appellate court affirmed, that "[n]ot
serving Shelia J. with a subpoena when that was possible and when that step
was a foreseeable potential condition to her presence at trial was not
reasonable, and does not reflect the constitutionally required good-faith effort
to secure King's right to confront his accuser."
300
Because Shelia J. was not truly "unavailable," her statements were
erroneously introduced at trial, and the trial court accordingly reversed the
convictions against King that implicated Shelia J.301
On appeal, King challenged the convictions against him that implicated
Chandra T., asserting that the erroneously admitted testimony of Shelia J.
tainted the jury's convictions of the crimes against Chandra T.3 °2 The trial
court held that the error was harmless with regards to the convictions
292. Id., 32, 281 Wis. 2d 554, T 32, 697 N.W.2d 811, 32.
293. Id., 281 Wis. 2d 554, T 32, 697 N.W.2d 811, 32.
294. 2005 Wi App 224, 706 N.W.2d 181.
295. Id. 77 2-3, 706 N.W.2d 181, 7 2-3.
296. Id., T 2, 706 N.W.2d 181,12.
297. Id., TT 3-4, 706 N.W.2d 181, 3-4.
298. Id., 16, 706 N.W.2d 181, T 16.
299. Id., 706 N.W.2d 181, 16.
300. Id., 17, 706 N.W.2d 181, T 17.
301. Id., 706 N.W.2d 181, 17.
302. Id., T22, 706 N.W.2d 181,722.
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involving Chandra T.3°3 The court of appeals affirmed.3 °4
In order to adduce whether the error was harmless, the court considered
the following factors:
[T]he frequency of the error, the importance of the
erroneously admitted evidence, the presence or absence of
evidence corroborating or contradicting the erroneously
admitted evidence, whether the erroneously admitted
evidence duplicates untainted evidence, the nature of the
defense, the nature of the State's case, and the overall
strength of the State's case.3 °5
The court of appeals found that the convictions against King were proper
and that the error of admitting Shelia J.'s testimony was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because of the following: the two attacks involved different
women and occurred on different days; Chandra T. testified at trial and was
subjected to full cross-examination; there was no overlap in the Shelia J. and
Chandra T. evidence; the court instructed the jury to consider separately each
charge against King; and there was direct physical evidence linking King and
Chandra T.306
5. State v. Stuart and Preliminary Hearing Testimony
In State v. Stuart,30 7 Gary Reagles was found dead in his apartment, with
one bullet in his chest, in 1990.308 Although first ruled a suicide, Paul Stuart
was charged with the first-degree intentional homicide of Reagles in 1998
based upon statements made to the police by Stuart's brother, John Stuart. 30 9
According to John Stuart, the defendant "confessed to shooting Reagles
because of cocaine and because Reagles was going to say something about a
recent burglary perpetrated by the two [Stuart] brothers. 310 John testified to
this effect at the preliminary hearing and in accordance with a plea bargain he
303. Id., 706 N.W.2d 181, 122.
304. Id., 23, 706 N.W.2d 181, 23.
305. Id., 22, 706 N.W.2d 181, 22. (quoting State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, 61, 277 Wis. 2d 593,
61,691 N.W.2d 637, 161).
306. Id., 123, 706 N.W.2d 181, 23.
307. 2005 WI47, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 695 N.W.2d 259.
308. Id., 4, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 4, 695 N.W.2d 259, 4.
309. Id., 1 4-5, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 14-5, 695 N.W.2d 259, 9 4-5.
310. Id., 6, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 6, 695 N.W.2d 259, 6.
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negotiated with the State.311
At trial, John asserted the privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to testify because he believed that the State did not uphold the plea bargain he
had negotiated in exchange for his testimony at trial.312 The State introduced
John's preliminary hearing testimony to the jury by reading it into
evidence.313 Five other witnesses testified that Stuart told them he had killed
Reagles as well. 314  Stuart was convicted of first-degree intentional
homicide.
3 15
Stuart appealed the conviction, claiming his confrontation rights were
violated when John's testimony was introduced at trial.316 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court began its analysis by determining that John's preliminary
hearing testimony was per se testimonial in nature under Crawford.317 Under
Crawford, the court then must decide whether the declarant was (1)
unavailable and (2) meaningfully cross-examined previously in order to admit
318the testimony.
Next, the court determined that John was unavailable but that Stuart's
prior opportunity to cross-examine John at the preliminary hearing was
"insufficient to satisfy his right to confrontation., 319 The court found that the
cross-examination was insufficient because the scope of cross-examination at
preliminary hearings in Wisconsin "is limited to issues of plausibility, not
credibility ' 320 and is not intended to be a "'full evidentiary trial on the issue
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' '321 At the preliminary hearing, Stuart
did not have the opportunity "to question his brother about a potential motive
to testify falsely., 322 Thus, admitting John's testimony at trial was erroneous
and violated Stuart's Confrontation right.323
Next, the court determined whether this error was harmless-whether the
311. Id., T 14, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 14, 695 N.W.2d 259, 14.
312. Id., 12, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 12, 695 N.W.2d 259, 12.
313. Id., 16, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 16, 695 N.W.2d 259, 16. Although the trial court did not at
first admit John Stuart's testimony to be read to the jury, the Wisconsin Supreme Court admitted the
testimony after an interlocutory appeal. Id., 14-16, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 14-16, 695 N.W.2d 259,
14-16.
314. Id., 17, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 17, 695 N.W.2d 259, 17.
315. Id., 18, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 18, 695 N.W.2d 259, 18.
316. Id., 22, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 22, 695 N.W.2d 259, 22.
317. Id., 28, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 28, 695 N.W.2d 259, 28.
318. Id., 29, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 29, 695 N.W.2d 259, 29.
319. Id., 279 Wis. 2d 659, 29, 695 N.W.2d 259, 29.
320. Id., 30, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 30, 695 N.W.2d 259, 30.
321. Id., 279 Wis. 2d 659, T 30, 695 N.W.2d 259, 30 (quoting State v. Dunn, 359 N.W.2d
151, 154 (1984)).
322. Id., 35, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 35, 695 N.W.2d 259, 35.
323. Id., 38, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 38, 695 N.W.2d 259, 38.
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error, beyond a reasonable doubt, "'did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.' 324 Like in King,325 the harmless error doctrine requires the court
to examine the following factors: the frequency of the error, the importance of
the erroneously admitted evidence, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the erroneously admitted evidence, whether the
erroneously admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence, the nature of the
defense, the nature of the State's case, and overall strength of the State's
case. 326 The court found that four witnesses that corroborated John's story
were not trustworthy because of their many criminal convictions and because
their testimony was contradicted by witnesses for the defense.327
Furthermore, the court found that John's testimony was very important to the
State's case; the State's case was weak without John's testimony; no other
untainted evidence corroborated John's testimony; and the nature of the
defense (that Reagles committed suicide) was affected by John's testimony.328
Based on these factors, the court held that error of admitting John's testimony
was not harmless, and Stuart's case was remanded for a new trial.3 29
6. State v. Smith: The Danger of Opening the Door
In State v. Smith, 330 Smith and two fellow gang members, Willie Nunn
and Cornelius Blair, went to the home of Andrew and Dorothy Roberts to rob
the couple at the bidding of Smith's gang leader.331 Blair and Smith went
inside while Nunn stayed outside as a look out for police.332
According to Smith, he and Blair, armed with guns, forced both Mr. and
Mrs. Roberts to floor and demanded money from Mr. Roberts.333 Mr. Roberts
gave Smith the money.334 As Smith and Blair were leaving, Mr. Roberts
grabbed the leg of Smith, causing Smith to shoot towards Mr. Roberts. 335
Smith thought that he had killed Mr. Roberts; therefore, he shot Mrs. Roberts
324. Id., 39-40, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 7 39-40, 695 N.W.2d 259, 39-40 (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
325. State v. King, 2005 WI App 224, 22, 706 N.W.2d 181, T 22.
326. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, 41, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 41,695 N.W.2d 259, 41.
327. Id., 46-47, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 46-47, 695 N.W.2d 259, 46-47.
328. Id., 54-56, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 54-56, 695 N.W.2d 259, 54-56.
329. Id., 57-58, 279 Wis. 2d 659,1$ 57-58, 695 N.W.2d 259, 57-58.
330. 2005 WI App 152, 284 Wis. 2d 798, 702 N.W.2d 850.
331. Id., 2, 284 Wis. 2d 798, 12, 702 N.W.2d 850, 2.
332. Id., 3, 284 Wis. 2d 798, 3, 702 N.W.2d 850, 3.
333. Id., 284 Wis. 2d 798, 3, 702 N.W.2d 850, T 3.
334. Id., 284 Wis. 2d 798, 3, 702 N.W.2d 850, 3.
335. Id., 284 Wis. 2d 798, 3, 702 N.W.2d 850, 3.
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in the head to be sure there were no witnesses.336 Mr. Roberts later
survived.337
At the trial for the murder of Mrs. Roberts, Smith "sought to introduce
testimony from a Frederick Banks, who stated that when he was in jail, Nunn
told him that he (Nunn) had shot Mrs. Roberts., 338 The trial court would
admit the testimony "if Nunn was unavailable under the hearsay exception
allowing statements against penal interest., 339  When Nunn was deemed
unavailable (after invoking his rights under the Fifth Amendment), the court
allowed Banks to testify to Nunn's statement that Nunn, not Smith, shot Mrs.
Roberts.340
The State does not have a Confrontation right; however, when the defense
presented Nunn's hearsay statement to Banks at trial, the defense opened the
door for the State to present Nunn's other hearsay statements to police that
contradicted Banks' testimony. 341 To this end, the State called a police officer
to testify to the five prior statements that Nunn had given police in which he
denied shooting Mrs. Roberts.342 Smith was convicted.343 The court held that
"[a] defendant who introduces testimony from an unavailable declarant cannot
later claim that he was harmed by his inability to cross-examine that declarant
when prior inconsistent statements are introduced to impeach an out-of-court
statement introduced by the defendant. 344
C. Wisconsin's Trends
Although Wisconsin has not had much opportunity to exercise the
rationale of Crawford so far, this may just be the calm before the storm. So
far, Wisconsin seems to be cautiously following the national trends in
preserving confrontation rights of defendants in criminal trials. New
decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court may change the path of confrontation
in Wisconsin, especially in regards to 9-1-1 calls and excited utterances.345 In
the meantime, this Note analyzes and predicts what will happen to
336. Id., 284 Wis. 2d 798, 3, 702 N.W.2d 850, 3.
337. Id., 284 Wis. 2d 798, 3, 702 N.W.2d 850, 3.
338. Id., 4, 284 Wis. 2d 798, 4, 702 N.W.2d 850, 4.
339. Id., 5, 284 Wis. 2d 798, 5, 702 N.W.2d 850, 5.
340. Id., T 6, 284 Wis. 2d 798, 6, 702 N.W.2d 850, 6.
341. Id., 7, 284 Wis. 2d 798, 7, 702 N.W.2d 850, 7.
342. Id., 284 Wis. 2d 798, 7, 702 N.W.2d 850, 7.
343. Id., 284 Wis. 2d 798, 7, 702 N.W.2d 850, 7.
344. Id., 11,284 Wis. 2d 798, 11,702 N.W.2d 850, 11.
345. See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005); State v. Davis, I1I P.3d 844 (Wash.
2005).
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Wisconsin's evidentiary rules in criminal cases and the future of
confrontation.
1. Wisconsin Statutes after Crawford
After Crawford, several Wisconsin evidentiary statutes are at risk of being
invalidated in the context of criminal cases. Like many other states,
Wisconsin's evidentiary rules are based on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Thus, changes seem likely in the future for many of Wisconsin's rules, like
the federal rules. This next section predicts which evidentiary rules will
stand, fold, or remain a battleground in Wisconsin. These predictions are
based on the national trends discussed in the preceding sections.
2. Common Hearsay Exceptions Likely to be Invalidated
In an area that remains controversial, child witness statements are also
likely to no longer be admitted in Wisconsin unless subject to cross-
examination at trial, in person. Under section 908.08 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, the videotaped statements of children are deemed an exception to the
hearsay rule. After Crawford, videotaped statements of children are probably
not admissible because they are not subject to cross-examination by the
defendant at trial. In limited cases where the court finds that a child would be
traumatized by testifying in front of a violent defendant, Wisconsin courts
might allow videotaped statements of child witnesses. 346
A child victim's statements under the excited utterance exception are also
currently admitted 347 and applied liberally in cases involving a child victim
declarant.348 While excited utterances are generally admissible, courts may
not apply the standard for child witnesses so liberally in the future. Courts
nationally are construing the excited utterance exception more narrowly so as
not to violate a defendant's Confrontation right.349
Moreover, a child victim's statements were often admissible in Wisconsin
346. See Sherrie Bourg Carter & Bruce M. Lyons, The Potential Impact of Crawford v.
Washington on Child Abuse, Elderly Abuse and Domestic Violence Litigation, 28 CHAMPION 21
(2004); Grearson, supra note 143, at 467.
347. WIS. STAT. § 908.03(2) (2003-2004).
348. See State v. Huntington, 575 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Wis. 1998).
349. See In re R.A.C., 111 P.3d 487 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258
(Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); see also
Mosteller, supra note 100, at 590-94; Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 10-11; Child-Witness
Statement Out of Court is Admissible, supra note 116, at 22.
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before Crawford under a residual hearsay exception 35 or under medical
diagnosis or treatment exception. 351 Under the residual hearsay exception, the
court can admit the statement after it determines the statement is trustworthy
under the totality of the circumstances test. 352 After Crawford, however, the
residual hearsay exception is probably not an appropriate basis upon which to
admit testimony because it does not afford the defendant an opportunity for
cross-examination and confrontation.
The medical diagnosis exception is a tougher case, though. In State v.
Huntington, statements made by a child victim's mother to a nurse
practitioner investigating alleged abuse were admitted.353  In some
jurisdictions, such testimony may be deemed non-testimonial and thus
admissible (after undergoing a Roberts analysis). However, because the nurse
practitioner was investigating the abuse and the mother knew this fact, such
testimony would likely be inadmissible as a violation of the defendant's
Confrontation right under Crawford.
Presumably, child witness statements must now be generally subject to
cross-examination in order to be admitted.
Furthermore, past-recollection recorded statements 354 and statements
against penal or social interest 355 are all currently firmly rooted exceptions to
the hearsay rule. Under Crawford, these exceptions will likely no longer
allow an unavailable witness's testimony because the Confrontation right
would not be adequately protected in such a scenario. 356  In other
jurisdictions, these hearsay exceptions are no longer deemed "reliable"; the
declarant must now be subjected to cross-examination in order to admit his or
her statements at trial.
3. Hearsay Exceptions Left in the Gray Area
Currently, videotaped depositions are admitted at a criminal trial and do
not violate the Confrontation Clause.357 Such depositions are allowed into
trial evidence only if the declarant has died, is out of state, is too sick to
350. WIS. STAT. §§ 908.03(24), 908.045(6) (2003-2004); see also State v. Kevin L.C., 576
N.W.2d 62 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
351. WIS. STAT. § 908.03(4) (2003-2004); see Huntington, 575 N.W.2d at 277.
352. See State v. Padilla, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
353. 575 N.W.2d at 276-78.
354. WIS. STAT. § 908.03(5) (2003-2004).
355. § 908.045(4).
356. See also Murillo v. Frank, 316 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
357. WIS. STAT. § 967.04 (2003-2004).
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attend, or is unreachable by subpoena.358 In addition, the defendant is
required to attend the deposition.359
Because the defendant is required to attend the deposition and presumably
has then confronted the witness against him, videotaped depositions may still
be admissible after Crawford. However, because the defense may not have
adequate information at the time of deposition and may not have the
opportunity to fully cross-examine the declarant, it is likely that a court would
deem such a deposition an inadequate cross-examination and confrontation
under Crawford.360
Under section 908.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes, a declarant's statements
may be admitted at a criminal trial: if the declarant is unavailable and the
statements concern testimony about the defendant's then-existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition; 361 if the statement is a recorded
recollection;362 if the statement is a record of regularly conducted activity; 363
or if the statement is a health care provider record. 364 These categories of
hearsay likely present instances in which the statements are presumed non-
testimonial; however, a case-by-case analysis is required to determine
whether the statement was made in anticipation of litigation and thus
testimonial.
For instance, health provider records or records of regular activity may be
inadmissible hearsay because the records could have been made in
anticipation of litigation and therefore be deemed testimonial by a court.
Moreover, recorded recollections and testimony concerning the defendant's
then-existing condition may require the declarant's trial testimony and the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant even if the declarant does not
recall her original statements.365
Furthermore, the hearsay exception of admitting the former testimony of
an unavailable declarant 366 lies in a gray area, too. In most jurisdictions, a
declarant's testimony from a preliminary hearing in which the defendant had
358. § 967.04(5)(a)1-4.
359. § 967.04(4)(a).
360. If, however, the deposition of a witness for the defense is recorded, rather than a witness
for the prosecution, the prosecution has no right to confrontation and the testimony will likely be
admissible without the declarant testifying at trial. See State v. Smith, 2005 WI App 152, 702
N.W.2d 850.
361. WIS. STAT. § 908.03(3) (2003-2004).
362. § 908.03(5).
363. § 908.03(6).
364. § 908.03(6m).
365. See also Mosteller, supra note 100, at 586-87.
366. WIS. STAT. § 908.045(1) (2003-2004).
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an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant is still admissible.36 7 However,
a declarant's testimony from another person's trial, like the testimony of the
unavailable declarant in Hale, is clearly inadmissible without the declarant's
presence at trial. 368 In Wisconsin, because cross-examination at preliminary
hearings is limited to "plausibility, not credibility," preliminary hearing
testimony is inadequate to satisfy a defendant's Confrontation right.369
Finally, an unavailable declarant's statements concerning a recent
perception 37 may or may not be admissible. If it is similar to an excited
utterance, a recent perception statement will probably be admissible; however,
if it is more similar to testimony or was uttered in circumstances where
litigation was foreseeable, the recent perception statement will probably be
inadmissible.371
4. Hearsay Exceptions that Likely Remain Unchanged
The Wisconsin statute allowing co-conspirator statements when the co-
conspirator is unavailable still stands after Crawford.372 Also, a declarant's
statements will probably continue to be admitted at a criminal trial if the
declarant is unavailable and if the statements concern a present sense
impression,373 an excited utterance,374 or a medical diagnosis or treatment.375
Similar categories of such technical hearsay have been upheld consistently
across the United States since Crawford.376
In addition, any testimony accompanied by an opportunity at trial to
cross-examine the declarant should still be admitted; and business records can
still be admitted as non-testimonial evidence after undergoing a Roberts
analysis. Likewise, a defendant will still have had an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine a declarant even if the declarant at trial has no memory of his
past statement.377
367. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66-68 (2004).
368. See State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, 1, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 1, 691 N.W.2d 637, 1.
369. State v. Stuart, 2005 W1 47, 30, 279 Wis. 2d 659,1 30, 695 N.W.2d 259, 30.
370. WIS. STAT. § 908.045(2) (2003-2004).
371. See State v. Manuel, 2004 WI App 111, 275 Wis. 2d 146, 685 N.W.2d 525.
372. WIS. STAT. §§ 908.01(4)(b)5 (2003-2004); see also State v. Jenkins, 483 N.W.2d 262
(Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a criminal defendant has the same right to confront witnesses
under federal and state constitutions).
373. WIS. STAT. § 908.03(1) (2003-2004).
374. § 908.03(2).
375. § 908.03(4).
376. Many of these issues will be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in the cases of Davis and
Hammon in the spring of 2006. See supra Part VIB.5.
377. See Vogel v. State, 291 N.W.2d 838 (Wis. 1980).
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Moreover, an unavailable declarant's dying declaration 378 is currently
considered reliable in most jurisdictions because of the belief that a dying
person has no interest in lying; only the Roberts analysis need be applied.
In the end, most evidentiary rules and hearsay exceptions are no longer
admissible in criminal trials after Crawford. And as lower courts continue to
draw lines in the sand, the landscape of the Confrontation right in Wisconsin
continues to shift and change accordingly. The most pressing and definitive
issue in regards to confrontation is the definition of "testimonial," which the
U.S. Supreme Court will address in the spring of 2006.379
VIII. CONCLUSION: WHY IT MATTERS
The Crawford decision matters because it changes the way criminal courts
have done business under Ohio v. Roberts for nearly a quarter of a century.
Crawford changes the way courts define "reliability" and has forced lower
courts to draw lines in the sand concerning confusing hearsay issues. Only
time will tell whether these lines are what the U.S. Supreme Court intended
under a new phase of criminal law and defendants' rights.
A. What's Trust Got to Do with It?
In Crawford, the majority overturned the Court's previous reliance on
trustworthiness or reliability as a determining factor in the admissibility of
hearsay statements. Justice Scalia wrote, "[R]eliability is an amorphous, if
not entirely subjective, concept. There are countless factors bearing on
whether a statement is reliable .. . .By replacing categorical constitutional
guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to [the Framers']
design., 380  He added that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
"commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. 38'
Other legal scholars echo this concern. After all, the admissibility of
evidence should not be dependent on reliability or trustworthiness; the
reliability of evidence is to be determined by the fact finder. Friedman writes,
"The function of the trial is to give the fact finder an opportunity to make its
best assessment of the facts after considering all the evidence properly
378. WIS. STAT. § 908.045(3) (2003-2004).
379. Many of these issues will be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in the cases of Davis and
Hammon in the spring of 2006. See supra Part VI.B.5.
380. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67-68 (2004).
381. Id.; see also Adomeit, supra note 130, at 4.
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presented to it, reliable and unreliable. 382
In addition, hearsay exceptions do not even necessarily differentiate
effectively between reliable and unreliable testimony.383 Professor Friedman
explains that a dying declaration, for instance, is accepted as reliable because
the court believes that a dying person would never lie.384 Of course, dying
people lie, too. A court cannot let in hearsay based on whether or not it
believes people are lying. That is not the court's job. The jury or fact-finder
has the job of deciding whether or not it believes witnesses by listening to
direct testimony and cross-examination. In the end, whether a witness is in
fact lying or is in fact reliable to a court is not really the point. Jurors and
fact-finders must rely on the tools they have-the facts and the testimony
presented at trial that they can judge with their own eyes and ears-in order to
determine what and whom to believe.
Reliability and trustworthiness, then, are out and for good reason. A
court's determination, in short, is an unreliable way to determine admissibility
of hearsay evidence.
However, if reliability is really such a terrible way to determine the worth
of evidence, how can the Supreme Court continue to apply this standard for
non-testimonial evidence, co-conspirator statements, business records, and the
like? 385 Professor Imwinkiwlried hypothesizes:
As footnotes 6 and 8 in the Crawford opinion indicate, in
a given case the defense might be able to persuade the trial
judge that the business or official record in question was
prepared with a view to prosecution and, hence, is
'testimonial.' However, in other cases there will be no
governmental involvement in the production of the statement,
and the facts may dictate the conclusion that the report was
generated for a legitimate, non-litigation reason. Yet, as
several commentators have pointed out, such expert reports
can nevertheless be so untrustworthy and rely on such
subjective interpretive standards that it makes sense to apply
the Confrontation Clause and pressure the prosecution to
produce the expert as a trial witness subject to cross-
examination. In that light, exempting all 'non-testimonial'
382. Friedman, Adjusting, supra note 83, at 5-6.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Treatment of Prosecution Hearsay Under Crawford v.
Washington: Some Good News, But ... , 28 CHAMPION 16, 18 (2004).
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hearsay from Confrontation Clause scrutiny would be a step
in the wrong direction. 386
Like many other Crawford issues, it remains to be seen where the courts
will go with reliability and testimonial evidence.
B. Protection for Defendants?
Obviously, defendants-and not prosecutors-seem to benefit the most
from the Crawford decision. In Wisconsin, as in the federal system, the
central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure reliability of evidence
against criminal defendants by subjecting testimony to rigorous testing before
the fact-finding body. 387
Effective cross-examination, not arbitrary reliability tests, is the only way
to guarantee that the Confrontation Clause is upheld. 388 Crawford is certainly
the Court's strongest stance yet against questionable prosecution practices and
the admittance of untested testimony.389
Critics continue to remind us, though, that Crawford is not the last word
on Confrontation. Professor Imwinkelried writes, "[I]t is premature to
conclude that Crawford will be an unmitigated blessing for the defense.
While capitalizing on the Crawford majority's strictures on the use of
'testimonial' hearsay, the defense must be vigilant against prosecutorial
attempts to completely dismantle the Confrontation Clause restrictions on
non-testimonial hearsay under Roberts."
' 390
How the Supreme Court defines testimonial, however, may impact
Crawford's usefulness for defendants. In some respects, the Crawford
decision actually more narrowly defines testimonial statements; allowing a
court to merely declare a statement is non-testimonial actually could allow
more hearsay statements to be admitted at trial. So, while Crawford seems
promising for defendants right now, the reality may be different after many of
the post-Crawford issues are decided.
386. Id.
387. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990); State v. Jackson, 575 N.W.2d 475 (Wis.
1998).
388. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
389. Imwinkelried, supra note 385, at 18.
390. Id.
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C. Integrity and the Constitution
The Constitution has not changed since the Founders, but the way we
have interpreted it as legal scholars and students has changed dramatically
over the years. The Crawford decision restores some of the integrity to the
design of the Sixth Amendment, reinvigorating the Confrontation Clause with
meaning and substance. But because the Constitution is a "living" document,
it is always subject to new breaths of change.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia declared, "By replacing categorical
constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to
their design."39' What he meant is still up in the air. One critic comments,
"[I]t is an intriguing sentence, full of suspense and anticipation. The decision
represents Justice Scalia at his most serious and least conservative. Brilliantly
argued and brilliantly written, the opinion represents a tour de force, the
welding together of history and advocacy.
' 392
Whether history and advocacy are welded for the benefit of defendants
and the integrity of all person's Constitutional rights is a topic sure to require
new breadth and explanation in Wisconsin and throughout the nation in the
time to come. In the meantime, we must do our best to digest this spiraling
and intricate Confrontation Clause and its impact in criminal courts in
Wisconsin and beyond.
RORRY KINNALLY
391. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68.
392. Adomeit, supra note 130, at 4.
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